This paper studies the implication of extreme shocks for monetary policy. The analysis is based on a small-scale New Keynesian model with sticky prices and wages where shocks are drawn from asymmetric Generalized Extreme Value distributions. A nonlinear perturbation solution of the model is estimated by the simulated method of moments. Under the Ramsey policy, the central bank responds nonlinearly and asymmetrically to shocks. The trade-o¤ between targeting a gross in ‡ation rate above 1 (or a net in ‡ation rate above 0) as insurance against extreme shocks and targeting an average gross in ‡ation at unity to avoid adjustment costs is unambiguously decided in favour of strict price stability.
Introduction
Economies are occasionally subjected to extreme shocks that can have profound and long lasting e¤ects-think, for example, of the oil shocks in the 1970s or the …nancial shocks associated with the Great Recession. Thus, it is important to design policy by taking into account the fact that extreme events can happen sometimes. This paper studies the positive and normative implications of extreme shocks for monetary policy using a small-scale New Keynesian model with sticky prices and sticky-and more downwardly-rigid-wages (see Kim and Ruge-Murcia, 2009 ). Crucially, the model relaxes the usual assumption that shocks are normally distributed and assumes instead that they are drawn from asymmetric distributions with an arbitrarily long tail. Methodologically, we use tools from extreme value theory, which is a branch of statistics concerned with extreme deviations from the median of probability distributions. This theory was developed primarily in meteorology and engineering, where designers are interested in protecting structures against infrequent-but potentially damaging-events like earthquakes and hurricanes. 1 Previous research on the positive analysis of monetary policy typically works under the dual assumptions that the propagation mechanism is linear and that shocks are symmetric, usually normal. In some normative analysis, it is necessary to go beyond a linear approximation of the model dynamics to avoid spurious welfare implications, and a second-order approximation is consistent with any two-parameter distribution. Since the normal distribution satis…es this two-degrees-offreedom speci…cation, the normal distribution is also widely used in normative analysis. This strategy leads to tractable models, but, as we argue below, it is unsatisfactory for understanding policy responses to extreme events.
Instead, the shock innovations in our model are assumed to be drawn from generalized extreme value (GEV) distributions. This distribution is widely used in extreme value theory to model the maxima (or minima) of a sequence of random variables. 2 The distribution has three independent parameters that determine its …rst, second, and third moments. To be consistent with considering three moments of the distribution, we approximate the model dynamics using a third-order perturbation, and so our approximate solution is nonlinear. The nonlinear model is estimated by the simulated method of moments (SMM). In order to disentangle the relative contribution of asym- 1 Key contributions in extreme value theory are Fisher and Tippett (1928) , Gnedenko (1943) , and Jenkinson (1955) . For a review of applications in engineering, meteorology and insurance, see Embrechts et al. (1997) and Coles (2001) . 2 In the context of …nancial markets, this distribution could be motivated, for example, by Stein (2014) , who argues that the most optimistic investors drive asset prices, and by Adrian and Duarte (2017) , who model …nancial intermediaries subject to occasionally binding value-at-risk constraints. More generally, since many economic shocksstrikes, weather, political uncertainty, changes in commodity prices, etc.-feature long tails, the most constructive interpretation is to think of the GEV distribution as a way to capture a wide array of potentially large disturbances that are summarized here using a parsimonious number of structural shocks. 1 metric shocks and nonlinearity to our results, we also estimate a nonlinear version of the model with normal innovations. Results show that the data prefer a speci…cation where monetary policy innovations are drawn from a positively skewed distribution, and productivity and preference innovations are drawn from a negatively skewed distribution. This conclusion is based on structural estimates from the model and also supported by reduced-form estimates from the raw data.
Using the estimated parameters, we examine the normative implications of the model under the Ramsey policy. We …nd that the benevolent monetary authority responds asymmetrically to shocks and the change in the nominal interest rate is generally larger than that under the Taylor policy. In addition to investigating the optimal monetary policy response to large shocks, this paper derives speci…c policy prescriptions concerning optimal in ‡ation targets. This issue is important because in light of the recent Global Financial Crisis, Williams (2009 Williams ( , 2014 , Blanchard et al. (2010) , and Ball (2014) propose increasing in ‡ation targets in order to provide a larger bu¤er zone from the zero lower bound on interest rates. In one of the few contributions to the literature on optimal policy in an environment with extreme shocks, Svensson (1993) notes the tension between:
(i) acting prudently and incorporating systematically the possibility of extreme shocks into policy (e.g., by raising the in ‡ation target) and (ii) taking a wait-and-see approach. Under the wait-andsee approach, the monetary authority acts only if and when an extreme shock occurs and adjusts the policy variables appropriately to counteract its e¤ects. Our model incorporates such a trade-o¤ and uses quantitative analysis to compare these two strategies using a well-de…ned welfare metric.
We show that the solution to the trade-o¤ is solved unambiguously in favour of the wait-and-see approach. The reason is simply that while prudence calls for an optimal gross in ‡ation target above 1 as an insurance against extreme shocks that would require costly nominal wage cuts, such target involves price-and-wage adjustment costs that must paid in every period. Thus, under the Ramsey policy the optimal gross in ‡ation rate is virtually indi¤erent from 1 (i.e., strict price stability). The New Keynesian model used to study extreme shocks is based on our previous work (Kim and Ruge-Murcia, 2009). We use this model for two reasons. First, this model is highly nonlinear because of the asymmetry in wage adjustment costs. Nonlinearity is a key ingredient in evaluating the economic implications of extreme shocks because it can give rise to prudent behavior. Second, this model has a well-de…ned cost of de ‡ation in the form of very costly nominal wage cuts. 3 However, this project makes a distinct contribution from Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009). Our previous contribution attempts to evaluate Tobin's argument that in ‡ation "greases the wheels"of the labor market. That is, that in ‡ation eases the adjustment of the labor market after an adverse shock by speeding the decline of real wages. Instead, this paper examines the recent argument that in anticipation of extreme shocks, the monetary authority should increase in ‡ation targets (see the literature cited above). By relaxing the usual assumption that shocks are normally distributed and using a third-order perturbation method to solve the model, we can quantify the skewness risk faced by the authority in this environment and its implications for monetary policy.
Previous literature concerned with the implications of asymmetric shocks includes work by Barro (2006) , Andreasen (2012) , and Gourio (2012) on rare disasters, and by Ferreira (2016), Zeke (2016) and Ruge-Murcia (2017) on skewness risk. Disasters are low probability events where output (or consumption) drops by at least 15 percent from peak to trough as, for example, during the Great Depression. This paper complements literature on rare disasters by showing that even in the relatively calm, postwar U.S., agents face the possibility of large decreases in consumption primarily associated with the business cycle. This paper contributes to the literature on skewness risk by evaluating its positive and normative implications for monetary policy and in ‡ation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a small-scale New Keynesian model of an economy occasionally subject to extreme shocks. Section 3 discusses the estimation method, describes the data, and reports estimates of three versions of the model: a benchmark version with GEV innovations and asymmetric costs, and two alternative versions with normal innovations and symmetric costs. This section also examines the positive implications of the model for the moments of key macroeconomic variables and studies the responses of the economy to large shocks using impulse-response analysis. Sections 4 studies optimal monetary policy under the Ramsey policy. Finally, section 5 concludes and discusses some limitations of our analysis.
An Economy Subject to Extreme Shocks
The agents in this economy consist of …rms that produce di¤erentiated goods, households with idiosyncratic job skills, and a monetary authority. This section describes their behavior and the resulting equilibrium.
Firms
Firm i 2 [0; 1] hires heterogeneous labour supplied by households and combines it as
where h 2 [0; 1] is an index for households and ! > 1 is a parameter that determines the elasticity of substitution between labour types. This labour aggregate is employed to produce output using 3 the technology
where y i;t is output, 2 (0; 1) is a parameter and z t is a productivity shock. The price of the labour input is
where W h t is the nominal wage of household h. The productivity shock follows the process
where ' 2 ( 1; 1) and t is an innovation assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with mean zero and skewness di¤erent from zero. By allowing for non-zero skewness, this speci…cation relaxes the standard assumption that shocks are symmetrically distributed around the mean, and, hence, a positive realization is as likely as a negative realization of the same magnitude.
Frequently, the assumption of symmetry is not explicit but rather the result of assuming that shocks are drawn from normal distributions. Instead, in our economy, innovations are drawn from an asymmetric distribution. Since agents face the possibility of extreme realizations from the long tail of the distribution, they are subject to skewness risk. In the empirical part of the paper, we assume that innovations are drawn from a generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution.
Goods market frictions induce a convex cost whenever nominal prices are adjusted. This cost is represented using the linex function (Varian, 1974) i t = (P i;t =P i;t 1 ) = exp ( (P i;t =P i;t 1 1)) + (P i;t =P i;t 1 1) 1 They also …nd that the managerial time and e¤ort involved in price increases is di¤erent than for decreases.
Under the function (5) , the adjustment cost depends on both the sign and magnitude of the price change, with > 0 corresponding to the case where a nominal price increase involves a smaller 4 frictional cost than a price decrease of the same magnitude. The converse is true in the case where < 0. In the special case where approaches zero, (5) nests the quadratic function in Rotemberg (1982) . Hence, it is straightforward to compare statistically the model with asymmetric costs and the restricted version with quadratic costs.
The …rm maximizes
where E s is the expectation conditional on information available at time s, 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, t is the marginal utility of consumption, c i;t is total consumption demand for good i, 1 i t (P i;t =P t )c i;t is real revenue net of adjustment costs, n h t is hours worked by household h,
is the real wage bill, and P t is the aggregate price index, which is de…ned as
The maximization is subject to a downward-sloping consumption demand function (see (14) , below), the technology (2), and the condition that supply must meet demand for good i at the posted price.
The optimal demand for labour h is
where !=(! 1) is the elasticity of demand of labour h with respect to its relative wage.
Households
Household h maximizes
where c h t is consumption, is a positive parameters, and u t is a preference shock. 4 The weight of the disutility of labour is set to 1 in (9), but this normalization is inconsequential because this weight only scales the number of hours worked in steady state and does not a¤ect the dynamics of the model. Consumption is an aggregate of the di¤erentiated goods produced by …rms, 4 The assumption of logarithmic consumption preferences is based on preliminary results that show that the curvature parameter in a more general CRRA function is not statistically di¤erent from 1. Moreover, for empirically plausible values, this parameter has a limited e¤ect on the quantitative implications of the model.
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where > 1 is a parameter that determines the elasticity of substitution between goods. The preference shock follows the process
where % 2 ( 1; 1) and t is an innovation assumed to be i.i.d. with mean zero, skewness di¤erent from zero, and independent of the productivity innovation, t .
Labour market frictions induce a convex cost whenever nominal wages are adjusted. This cost is represented using the function
where 2 (0; 1) and 2 ( 1; 1). In the case where > 0, a nominal wage decrease involves a larger frictional cost than a wage increase of the same magnitude, and wages are, therefore, more downwardly than upwardly rigid. When ! 0 the cost function is the quadratic function and wage increases and decreases of the same magnitude are equally costly. When ! 1 the cost function takes the shape of an "L" and wages are completely ‡exible upwards and in ‡exible downwards.
Downward wage rigidity is discussed by Keynes (1936, ch. 21) and is consistent with the observation that the cross-sectional distribution of individual wages is positively skewed with a peak at zero and very few nominal wage cuts. For example, see Akerlof et al. (1996) , and Card The household is subject to the budget constraint
where B h t is a one-period nominal bond, I t is the gross nominal interest rate, and D h t are dividends. In addition to this budget constraint and a no-Ponzi-game condition, utility maximization is subject to the demand for labour h by …rms (see (8) ). The optimal consumption of good i satis…es
which is decreasing in the relative price with elasticity =( 1). 6 
Monetary Policy
The monetary authority (or "the Fed") sets the interest rate following the Taylor-type rule
where 1 2 ( 1; 1), 2 and 3 are parameters; variables without time subscript denote steady-state values; and t is a monetary shock that represents factors that a¤ect the nominal interest rate beyond the control of the Fed. We assume that t is i.i.d. with mean zero, skewness di¤erent from zero, and independent of the innovations to productivity ( t ) and the preference shock ( t ).
The GEV Distribution
Under the Fisher-Tippett theorem (Fisher and Tippett 1928) , the maxima of a sample of i.i.d.
random variables converge in distribution to one of three possible distributions: the Gumbel, the Fréchet, and the Weibull distributions. Jenkinson (1955) shows that these distributions can be represented in a uni…ed way using a generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution. The probability density function (PDF) of the GEV distribution is
with Depending on whether the shape parameter is zero, larger than zero, or smaller than zero, the GEV distribution corresponds to either the Gumbel, the Fréchet, or the Weibull distribution, respectively. The shape parameter also determines the thickness of the long tail and the skewness of the distribution. In the case where the shape parameter is non-negative, the skewness is positive. In the case where the shape parameter is negative, the skewness can be negative or positive depending on the relative magnitudes of the shape and scale parameters. The fact that the GEV distribution allows for both positive and negative skewness of a potentially large magnitude is particularly attractive for this paper because, as we will see below, the U.S. data prefer speci…cations where the skewness of the innovations is relatively large. 5 There are values of the shape parameter for which some moments of the distribution do not exist-for example, the mean is not de…ned when this parameter is larger than or equal to 1-but this turns out to be not empirically relevant here. 
Equilibrium
In the symmetric equilibrium, all …rms are identical and all households are identical. This means that all …rms charge the same price, demand the same quantity of labour, and produce the same quantity of output; all households supply the same amount of labour and receive the same wages;
and net bond holdings are zero.
Equilibrium in the goods market implies the aggregate resource constraint
where y t is aggregate output and w t = W t =P t is the real wage. In the special case where prices and wages are ‡exible, c t = y t , meaning that all output produced is available for private consumption.
Instead, when prices and wages are rigid, part of the output is lost to frictional costs (the term is parenthesis in (17)). When prices and wages are constant, there are no deadweight losses ( t = t = 0). This result indeed holds in the cases where: (i) there is no uncertainty or (ii) certaintyequivalent applies. However, in the more relevant case where the social welfare function is concave in in ‡ation and there is uncertainty, optimal gross in ‡ation may be di¤erent from 1 as a result of precautionary behaviour by the planner.
Model Solution
The model is solved using a perturbation method that approximates the policy functions using a third-order polynomial in the state variables and moments of the innovations. Jin and Judd (2002) explain in detail this method and establish the conditions under which the approximate solution exists. The solution is nonlinear by construction because it contains linear, quadratic, and cubic terms in the state variables. The solution also features a risk adjustment factor that depends on both the variance and the skewness of the innovations. 6 The original interest rate series, which is quoted as a net annual rate, is transformed into a gross quarterly rate. Except for the nominal interest rate, all data are seasonally adjusted at the source.
Estimation

Data
Estimation Method
The model is estimated by the simulated method of moments (SMM). De…ning 2 to be a q 1 vector of structural parameters, the SMM estimator, b , is the value that solves
where W is a p p weighting matrix, T is the sample size, is a positive integer, m t is a p 1 vector of empirical observations on variables whose moments are of interest to us, and m ( ) is a synthetic counterpart of m t with elements obtained from the stochastic simulation of the model.
Note that the SMM estimator minimizes the weighted distance between the unconditional moments predicted by the model and those computed from the data, where the moments predicted by the model are computed on the basis of arti…cial data simulated from the model. Du¢ e and Singleton (1993) show that under general regularity conditions SMM delivers consistent and asymptotically normal parameter estimates.
In this application, the weighting matrix is the diagonal of the inverse of the matrix with the long-run variance of the moments. This weighting matrix makes the objective function scale free and gives a larger weight to the moments that are more precisely estimated. 8 The long-run variance of the moments is computed using the Newey-West estimator with a Bartlett kernel and bandwidth given by the integer of 4(T =100) 2=9 , where T = 208 is the sample size. The number of simulated observations is 100 times larger than the sample size (i.e., = 100). 9 In order to attenuate the e¤ect of starting values on the results, the simulated sample contains 100 additional shocks. During the estimation procedure the discount factor ( ) is …xed to 0:995, which is close to the the mean of the inverse ex-post real interest rate in the sample period. The steady-state (gross) in ‡ation target ( ) in the monetary policy rule is set to 1. 10 The elasticity parameter of the production function (1 ) is set to 2=3, based on data from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) that show that the share of labour in total income is approximately this value.
Finally, the elasticities of substitution between goods and between labour types are respectively …xed to values standard in the literature, namely, = 1:1 and ! = 1:4:
The moments used to estimate these parameters are the variances, covariances, autocovariances and skewness of consumption, hours worked, price in ‡ation, the real wage, and the nominal interest rate: 25 moments in total. In addition to the benchmark nonlinear model with GEV innovations and asymmetric adjustment costs, we estimate two alternative models: a model with asymmetric adjustment costs but normal innovations, and a model with GEV innovations but quadratic adjustment costs. Comparing these two speci…cations with the benchmark model allows us to evaluate the relative contribution of relaxing the assumptions of symmetric (normal) shock innovations and symmetric (quadratic) adjustment costs. 11 8 For a comparison of the e¢ ciency of the SMM estimator under this and other weighting matrices see Ruge-Murcia (2012, sec. 4.3) 9 Using a relative large value for is important to accurately estimate the skewness implied by the model, but it has the drawback that it makes computationally costly the use of bootstrap methods to compute standard errors. For this reason, we report asymptotic standard errors in section 3.3 with the warning that Monte-Carlo results in Ruge-Murcia (2012) show that they may not always be a good approximation to the actual variability of SMM estimates in small samples.
1 0 This choice is driven primarily by computational convenience. The steady state of the model can be computed analytically when = 1, but it must be computed numerically when 6 = 1. Since the model has to be solved in each iteration of the optimization routine that minimizes (18), setting = 1 reduces substantially computational costs. However, sensitivity analysis shows that similar values of deliver basically the same results. 1 1 Also, in an online appendix, we report results from the estimation of the benchmark model using Hodrick-Prescott …ltered data and show that parameter estimates are moderately robust to the method used to detrend the raw data. 10 Table 1 reports SMM estimates and asymptotic standard errors for the di¤erent versions of the model. Let us focus …rst on the estimates obtained under the assumption that innovations follow GEV distributions and adjustment costs are asymmetric. The curvature parameter of labor in the utility function is relatively high (about 6:2), but it is imprecisely estimated. The adjustment cost parameters for wages and prices are quantitatively similar, but the former is somewhat larger than the latter suggesting that wages may be more rigid than prices. However, notice that the asymmetry parameter for wages is large, positive, and statistically signi…cant di¤erent from zero (at the 10% level). The one-sided test of the hypothesis that this parameter is zero against the alternative that it is positive can be rejected at the 5% level. Thus, wage rigidity is primarily downward rigidity, rather than upward rigidity. In contrast, the asymmetry parameter for prices is negative and statistically signi…cant at the 5% level meaning that prices are more upwardly than downwardly rigid. The fact that both asymmetry parameters are di¤erent from zero means that we can reject the hypothesis that adjustment costs are symmetric (quadratic as in Rotemberg, 1982) against the alternative that they are asymmetric (linex as in equations (5) and (12)). Figure 1 reports the estimated adjustment cost functions for wages and prices (thick lines) and compares them with quadratic cost functions (thin lines). 12 The horizontal axis is in ‡ation at the annual rate and the vertical axis is cost as percent of output. From equation (17) , notice that wage and price adjustment costs as a proportion of output are, respectively, w t n t t =y t and t . (For the purpose of constructing …gure 1, we …xed w t , n t , and y t to their steady-state values.) This …gure supports the following conclusions. First, the adjustment costs predicted by the model are not implausibly high in the neighborhood of price stability where gross in ‡ation equals 1, but they can increase quickly outside this region. Second, downward nominal wage rigidity is quantitatively and economically important so that, for example, an annual gross in ‡ation rate of 2% induces wage adjustment costs equal to 0:07% of output, but a de ‡ation rate of 2% induces adjustment costs equal to 0:34% of output. Finally, despite its statistical signi…cance, the asymmetry in price rigidity is quantitatively modest. For instance in ‡ation and de ‡ation rates of 2% respectively induce price adjustment costs of 0:19% and 0:12% of output.
Parameter Estimates
Estimates of the scale and shape parameters imply that productivity innovations are negatively skewed with skewness equal to 0:59. The result that the shape parameter is not statistically di¤erent from zero means that, among extreme value distributions, the one that best describes productivity innovations is the Gumbel distribution. Figure 2 plots the estimated probability density function (PDF) (thick line) and compares it with the PDF of a normal distribution with the same standard deviation (thin line). Note that the PDF of the GEV distribution has more probability mass in the left tail and less mass in the right tail, than the normal distribution. Thus, extreme negative productivity shocks can occasionally happen, but large positive ones are unlikely.
Additional evidence on the skewness of productivity innovations is reported in the last columns of table 1 (under the heading "Single Equation") and in …gure 3. For this analysis, we use the series on total factor productivity (TFP) series constructed by John Fernald (Fernald, 2014) Table 1 shows that the autoregressive coe¢ cient from the single-equation estimation is quantitatively close to the SMM estimates from the full model. Estimates of the distribution parameters are also similar to those of the full model, but since the shape parameter is statistically di¤erent from zero, single-equation estimates suggest that productivity innovations follow a Weibull, rather than a Gumbel, distribution. The left panel in …gure 3 plots the histogram of the residuals of the regression (4) and shows that they are negatively skewed with a skewness of 0:10, which is smaller than, but still consistent with, the estimate of 0:59 obtained from the full model.
An alternative way to illustrate the departure of productivity innovations from normality is the quantile-quantile (q-q) plot in …gure 4. 13 The left panel in …gure 4 plots the quantiles of the residuals of the regression (4) versus the theoretical quantiles of a standard normal distribution. If the residuals were normally distributed the plot would be close to linear. As we can see in …gure 4, the lower quantiles of the empirical distribution of the residuals features larger realizations (in absolute value) than are consistent with a normal distribution. These observations account for the negative skewness of productivity innovations and as shown in the …gure, they are appear to be primarily associated with recessions.
The preference shock is very persistent and estimates of the scale and shape parameters imply that its innovations are negatively skewed with skewness equal to 0:92. In this case, the shape parameter is statistically di¤erent from zero, which means that innovations to the preference shock follow a Weibull distribution. The middle panel of …gure 2 plots the estimated PDF of preference innovations and shows that the distribution has more probability mass in the left tail and less mass in the right tail, than a normal distribution with the same standard deviation, as for the the nonlinearity of the model. However, in some cases (e.g., consumption and hours worked), the predicted skewness is much lower than in the data, and in the case of wage in ‡ation the predicted skewness is of sign opposite to the data. For the model with GEV innovations, column 2 shows that the combination of nonlinearity and asymmetric innovations deliver skewness that is quantitatively similar to the data. Notice, however, that also in this case the predicted skewness for wage in ‡ation is of sign opposite to the data.
Alternative Models
Let us now turn to the SMM estimates based on the other alternative model with GEV innovations but quadratic adjustment costs. The reason for the latter result is simply that normal shocks propagated through a nonlinear model would produce non-normal series. The result that the hypothesis is rejected (cannot be rejected) when innovations are GEV (normal) is, of course, obtained by construction.
Impulse Responses
Using our benchmark estimates in the …rst column of table 1, we study the response of the economy to productivity, preference, and monetary shocks using impulse-response analysis. We compute the responses to shock innovations in the 5th and 95th percentiles, which are assumed to occur when all variables are equal to the unconditional mean of their ergodic distribution. The size (in absolute value) of these innovations is not same for an asymmetric distribution like the GEV, but the point here is that the likelihood of the two realizations is the same. As we will see in …gures 5 through 7, responses are qualitatively similar to those reported in earlier New Keynesian literature, except for the fact that in this model they are asymmetric, with shocks of a given sign having larger e¤ects than the equally likely shock of the opposite sign. Figure 5 plots the responses to productivity shocks for the model with GEV innovations. The vertical axis is the percentage deviation from the mean of the ergodic distribution and the horizontal axis is quarters. The positive shock in the 95th percentile of the distribution induces an increase in consumption, which is persistent as a result of intertemporal smoothing. Hours worked increase on impact and, following a hump, return to their unconditional mean from below. Price in ‡ation and the nominal interest rate decrease; in the case of the interest rate because the in ‡ation coe¢ cient in the Taylor rule is quantitatively larger than that of output. Finally, the wage in ‡ation increases on impact, goes below the mean of its ergodic distribution for a brief period, and then increases again returning to its unconditional mean from above. Since prices are more ‡exible than wages, the shock induces an increase in the real wage. Due to the strong wage rigidity, the response of wage in ‡ation is relatively muted. Qualitatively, the e¤ects of the negative shock in the 5th percentile are the opposite to those just described. However, the key observation in …gure 4 is that the e¤ects of the negative shock are larger than those of the equally likely positive shock. This result is partly due to the fact that the size of these two innovations is di¤erent for the asymmetric GEV distribution:
the negative innovation takes productivity 2:16 percent below the steady state, while the positive innovation takes it 1:69 percent above. This relatively modest di¤erence in shock size is ampli…ed by the nonlinearity of the model leading to the asymmetric responses reported in …gure 5. Figure 6 plots the responses to monetary shocks. The positive shock raises the interest rate and induces a decrease in consumption and hours worked and an increase in price in ‡ation and wage in ‡ation. Since the response of wage in ‡ation is much larger than that of price in ‡ation, the real wage increases. The negative shock has the converse e¤ects, but, as before, the key result is the asymmetry in the responses to monetary shocks: the positive shock induces larger responses than the equally likely negative shock. The fact that GEV distribution of monetary shocks has a large positive skewness means that the size of the two innovations is substantially di¤erent: the positive innovation takes the interest rate 0:81 percent above the steady state, while the negative innovation takes it 0:54 percent below. Hence, both the shock asymmetry and the model nonlinearity account for the asymmetric responses reported in …gure 6.
Finally, …gure 7 plots the responses to preference shocks. The positive shock increases the utility level of consumption and, hence, consumption increases. The associated increase in output, induces an increase in hours worked. Recall that, by construction, this shock does not alter the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption. Both price and wage in ‡ation increase and in roughly the same magnitude so that response of the real wage to the positive shock is relatively muted. The negative shock induces the converse e¤ects, but e¤ects are asymmetric. For example, the negative shock induces a decrease in consumption of 0:59 percent, while the positive shock induces an increase of 0:36 percent. The largest asymmetry concerns the real wage: the negative shock induces an increase 0:15 percent, while the positive shock induces a decrease of 0:07 percent, which is half the size of the response to the negative shock.
In summary, results in this section show that negative productivity and preference shocks have larger e¤ects than equally likely positive shocks, while positive monetary policy shocks have larger e¤ects than equally likely negative shocks. These results are due the asymmetry of the shock innovations and their ampli…cation through the nonlinear propagation mechanism of the model.
In turn, these asymmetric e¤ects induce negative skewness in consumption, hours worked, and the real wage, and positive skewness in price in ‡ation, wage in ‡ation, and the nominal interest rate, which are roughly in line with the U.S. data.
The Ramsey Policy
Consider a monetary authority that follows the Ramsey policy of maximizing the households' welfare by choosing fc t ; n t ; W t ; I t ; t ; t g 1 t=s to maximize
subject to the resource constraint and the …rst-order conditions of …rms and households, and taking the previous values for wages, goods prices, and shadow prices as given. It is assumed that the monetary authority can commit to the implementation of the optimal policy and that it discounts future utility at the same rate as households. The model is solved using a third-order perturbation with parameter estimates equal to those reported in the …rst column of table 1. Figure 8 (resp. …gure 9) plots the rule as a function of the productivity shock (resp. preference shock) holding all the other state variables at their values in the deterministic steady state. In these …gures, the vertical axis is the percentage deviation from the deterministic steady state and the horizontal axis is the size of the shock normalized by their standard deviation.
Decision Rules
The thick line is the nonlinear decision rule implied by our third-order perturbation, while the thin line is the linear policy function implied by a …rst-order perturbation. for all variables, the policy rules imply larger adjustment in the variables when the economy is hit by a negative, than when it is hit by a positive, productivity shock. That is, the response of the Ramsey planner to productivity shocks is asymmetric. Up to the extent that productivity shocks are negatively skewed-and, hence, there are more large realizations from the left than from the right side of the distribution-the optimal policy calls for occasional, large interest rate adjustments in response to extreme productivity shocks Figure 9 shows that under the Ramsey policy, the planner adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to the preference shock and undoes its e¤ects on consumption, hours worked, the real wage, price in ‡ation, and wage in ‡ation. For this reason, the coe¢ cients of this shock in their decision rules are zero and the plots in …gure 9 are horizontal lines that cross the vertical axis at zero. In contrast, the decision rule for the nominal interest rate is upward-sloping and linear. That is, the coe¢ cients of the higher-order terms in the nonlinear decision rule are zero and, thus, the rule in the nonlinear model is just a shifted version of the rule in the linear model. The linearity of this decision rule implies that the optimal interest rate response to preference shocks is symmetric. Figure 10 plots the optimal responses to productivity shocks under the Ramsey policy. As before, the shocks are innovations in the 5th and 95th percentiles of the GEV distribution and take place when all variables are equal to the unconditional mean of their ergodic distribution. The positive productivity shock induces a persistent increase in consumption and hours worked as agents take advantage of their temporarily high productivity. Wage in ‡ation increases and price in ‡ation decreases leading to an unambiguous increase in the real wage. Qualitatively these responses are similar to those obtained under the Taylor rule policy. The negative shock induces the converse e¤ects, but their magnitudes are larger than for the positive shock in all cases. As discussed in section 3.5, the size of the productivity innovation at the 5th percentile is only somewhat larger than that at the 95th percentile, and, thus, the asymmetry in the responses reported in …gure 10
Impulse Responses
is due primarily to the nonlinearity of the model.
Regarding the nominal interest rate, notice that the positive productivity shock calls for an interest rate decrease of basically the same magnitude as under the Taylor policy (see …gure 4).
Instead, the negative productivity shock calls for an interest rate increase of a larger magnitude under the Ramsey than under the Taylor policy. Hence, the asymmetry of the interest rate response to productivity shocks is more pronounced under the Ramsey than under the Taylor policy and, in particular, involves stronger responses to large negative shocks. Figure 11 plots the optimal responses to the preference shock under the Ramsey policy. As anticipated from the decision rules in …gure 9, the interest rate response under the Ramsey policy undoes the e¤ects of this shock on the other variables, and they remain at the mean of their ergodic distribution after the shock. The Ramsey policy calls for an increase in the nominal interest rate in response to the positive preference shock, and a decrease in response to the negative preference shock. However, since the decision rule is linear, the asymmetry in the responses in …gure 11 is primarily the result of the asymmetry in the distribution of the innovations to the preference shock.
Optimal In ‡ation
We measure the optimal in ‡ation rate by the mean of the ergodic distribution of in ‡ation under the Ramsey policy. For the parameter estimates reported in table 1, mean annual gross in ‡ation computed from a simulation of 20; 000 observation is basically 1 (or, more precisely, 0:99998). This means that optimal expected in ‡ation is essentially the same as the in ‡ation rate in the deterministic steady state. This result is remarkable because the model is nonlinear and, consequently, it does not feature certainty equivalence. Hence, one would expect di¤erent average in ‡ation rates in the stochastic and deterministic steady states of the model. In particular, a prudent Ramsey plannerwho faces skewness risk in the form of possibly large negative shocks from the left tail of the productivity distribution, which may require costly downward nominal wage adjustments-should target an average rate of price in ‡ation above unity. However, this conjecture is not con…rmed in our model because the Ramsey planner actually needs to trade o¤ the bene…ts of acting prudently with the costs of systematically incurring price and wage adjustment costs when gross in ‡ation is above 1. A similar result is reported by Coibion et al. (2012) , which shows in a calibrated model that for costly, but infrequent, episodes at the zero lower bound (ZLB) on interest rates, the optimal in ‡ation rate is low. 16 In one of the few contributions to the literature on optimal policy in an environment with 1 6 In previous work (Kim and Ruge-Murcia, 2009) we found that downward nominal wage rigidity dictates an optimal level of in ‡ation for the U.S. economy of about 0:35% per year. We note that, while the second-order perturbation used to solve the model in Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) implies a small but positive in ‡ation target, the third-order perturbation used to solve the model in this paper implies a target of practically zero (net) in ‡ation. This observation suggests that the third-order terms in the approximate policy rule are quantitatively and economically important. extreme shocks, Svensson (1993) notes the tension between: (i) acting prudently and incorporating systematically the possibility of extreme shocks into policy and (ii) taking a wait-and-see approach.
An example of the …rst strategy is increasing the in ‡ation target, as proposed by Williams (2009 Williams ( , 2014 , Blanchard et al. (2010) , and Ball (2014) some of whom advocate in ‡ation targets of 4% per year, as opposed to the 2% per year currently used by the Federal Reserve and some other central banks. In our model, the trade-o¤ between the two options in Svensson (1993) arises for the following reason. On the one hand, prudence induces the policy market to target a gross in ‡ation rate above 1 in order to avoid costly nominal wage cuts. On the other hand, price and wage adjustment costs induce the policy maker to target a gross in ‡ation rate equal to 1 and, instead, to aggressively adjust the policy variable(s) when an extreme, negative shock occurs. As we can see, the quantitative welfare analysis of these two strategies in our model unambiguously favours strict price stability and a wait-and-see approach.
Conclusion
This paper uses tools from extreme value theory to study the positive and normative implication of extreme events for monetary policy. Our New Keynesian model incorporates a trade-o¤ between (i) acting prudently and systematically incorporating the possibility of extreme shocks into policy (e.g., by targeting a gross in ‡ation target above 1) and (ii) taking a wait-and-see approach whereby the central banker targets a gross in ‡ation rate close to 1 but adjusts policy variables aggressively when a extreme negative shocks hits the economy. We evaluate the welfare implication of these two approaches and …nd that for our estimated model, this trade-o¤ is solved unambiguously in favour of the wait-and-see approach. The intuition is simple: the cost of price and wage adjustments required under the prudent policy in every period overrides the potential bene…t of the prudent policy in the expectation of large, but infrequent, extreme negative shock. As a result, the optimal gross in ‡ation rate under the Ramsey policy is virtually indi¤erent from 1 (that is, strict price stability).
In interpreting our …ndings it is important to keep in mind that the mechanism through which extreme shocks a¤ect welfare in our model is by increasing the likelihood of de ‡ation and, hence, costly nominal wage cuts. An alternative strategy that we did not pursue here is to consider the cost associated with the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Since the ZLB and downward nominal wage rigidity may lead to similar nonlinear dynamics, it is possible that they are modeling substitutes (e.g., see Coibion et al., 2012) and results may be robust to explicitly modeling the zero lower bound. We plan to examine this conjecture in future research. 
